

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ANKARA 00886 031324Z

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 0886

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR PFOR TU GR CY US
SUBJ: THE FUTURE COURSE OF U.S. TURKISH RELATIONS

1. THE RECENT ACTION OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE IN PROPOSING CONTINUING PUNITIVE RESTRICTIONS ON TURKEY HAS HAD A PROFOUNDLY ADVERSE EFFECT HERE. TOGETHER WITH MY LAST FRIDAY'S CONVERSATION WITH ELEKDAG (ANKARA 0815) AND THE EARLIER SISCO-ESENBEL CONVERSATION (STATE 022277, WHICH BECAUSE OF DELAYED SERVICING HAS ONLY JUST REACHED ME), THE SENATE'S ACTION SERVES AS AN UNWELCOME, BUT REALISTIC, REMINDER THAT TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO MARCH TO THE MEASURED BEAT OF VERY DIFFERENT DRUMMERS.

2. THE GOT AND THE USG ARE AGREED ON THE DESIRABILITY OF SETTLING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND REBUILDING THE SMASHED U.S.-TURKISH ALLIANCE. BOTH WOULD LIKE TO SEE BOTH DONE. BUT FOR LEADERS OF THE INCREASINGLY BELEAGUED PRO-WESTERN FACTION IN TURKEY, THE FOCUS IS ON THE LATTER. THEY WANT TO REGARD EARLIER CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS AS AN ABERRATION. THEY, ALONG WITH VIRTUALLY ALL TURKS OF WHATEVER POLITICAL ORIENTATION, CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE BEEN THE SINNED-AGAINST
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 00886 031324Z

PARTY ENTIRELY IN THE CYPRUS SITUATION. THEY FAIL TO CONCEDE,

OR EVEN PRIVATELY TO RECOGNIZE, ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THEIR PART. THEY HAVE BEEN RECENTLY OPERATING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT -- AND WHEN THEY SAY "GOVERNMENT" IN THIS CONTEXT THEY MEAN THE CONGRESS -- HAS GRADUALLY COME TO LEARN THE COMPLEXITY AND INTRACTABILITY OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. THEY HAVE HOPED, TOO, THAT THE USG HAS BEEN GRADUALLY GAINING AN INCREASED UNDERSTANDING OF THE "JUSTICE" OF THE TURKISH SIDE. IF NOT, THEY HAVE AT LEAST HOPED, AND ASSUMED, THAT AN INCREASED KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROBLEM WOULD PRECLUDE THE CONTINUATION OF A U.S. POLICY WHICH SINGLES OUT AND PENALIZES ONLY TURKEY AS THE CULPRIT. FINALLY, IT HAD BEEN HOPED THAT THE U.S. HAD AT LAST LEARNED THAT PUBLICLY BULLYING AN ALLY LIKE TURKEY IS NOT THE WAY TO GET TURKEY TO DO WHAT WE WISH; AND THAT TO TEAR UP THE U.S.-TURKISH ALLIANCE IS A SELF-INFLICTED WOUND.

3. OPERATING ON THESE ASSUMPTIONS, A PRIDEFUL GOT, STILL FEELING VERY MUCH THE AGGRIEVED PARTY, AND IN THE FACE OF VOCAL AND POTENTIALLY VERY STRONG DOMESTIC OPPOSITION, HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING TO REBUILD OUR RELATIONSHIP. IN DOING SO, THE TURKS ASSUMED THAT THE MAINTAINING OF A STABLEQ CREDIBLE AND FORMIDABLE DETERRENT ON THIS END OF THE NATO DEFENSE ONCE AGAIN HAS TAKEN A PRIORITY PLACE IN OUR JOINT OBJECTIVES.

4. THEY ARE NOT UNMINDFUL OF THE NEED ALSO TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE CYPRUS SITUATION, BUT AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THEY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE FORMER IS TO DEPEND ON THE LATTER. MOREOVER, THEY ARE PERSUADED THAT BOTH THEIR INTIMACY WITH THIS PROBLEM AND THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT IS REQUIRED IN DEALING WITH GREEKS IN CYPRUS AND IN ATHENS HISTORICALLY EXCEEDS OUR OWN BY A WIDE MARGIN. THEREFORE, WHAT SEEMS TO US (AND WHAT IN FACT IS) A CONSTANT GOT TEMPRIZING AND TRUCULENCE CONCERNING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS ONLY IN PARSA REFLECTION OF THE DISTASTE (AND PERHAPS POLITICAL INABILITY) OF THE NOT VERY COURAGEOUS PRESENT TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO FACE UP TO DIFFICULT DECISIONS. AND IT IS ONLY IN PART A REFLECTION OF THE SEEMINGLY PERPETUAL PREFERENCE OF BOTH TURKS AND GREEKS ENDLESSLY TO EXPLAIN THE PERFIDIOUSNESS OF THE OTHER, AND TO DO SO AS AN APPARENTLY WELCOME ALTERNATIVE TO FOCUSING ON THE DIFFICULT BUSINESS OF ARRIVING AT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ANKARA 00886 031324Z

SATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS TO COMMON PROBLEMS. IT IS ALSO, VERY IMPORTANTLY, A REFLECTION OF THE TURKISH CONVICTION THAT THEIR EXPERIENCE HAS TAUGHT THEM THAT IN DEALING WITH THE GREEKS THEY MUST DEAL SLOWLY, FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH, AND WITH THE GREATEST OF SKEPTICISM AND CAUTION.

5. BUT THEY KEP POINT, WHICH I MUST CONSTANTLY EMPHASIZE, IS THAT THE TURKS AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE WILL NOT REPEAT

NOT ALLOW OUR CURRENT NEGOTIATION FOR THE REBUILDING OF OUR RELATIONSHIP TO BE TIED TO THE CYPRUS SITUATION. WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN THESE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, EVEN THOUGH CONTINUING UNREALISTIC TURKISH MONEY DEMANDS MAY STILL SINK THEM. BUT THE KIND OF MONEY PROBLMES WE ARE FACING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE MOMENT APPEAR IN MOST NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS KIND, AND I HAVE NOT GIVEN UP HOPE THAT THEY CAN BE SURMOUNTED. IT IS THE DRUM BEAT PROBLEM WHICH SEEMS TO ME TO BE FAR MORE FUNDAMENTAL.

6. CONGRESS, TOO, WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM RESOLVED AND U.S.-TURKISH SECURITY RELATIONSHIP RESTORED. BUT AS BETWEEN THE TWO THE FORMER IS APPARENTLY THE FIRST OBJECTIVE. THIS CONGRESSIONAL COURSE (AND SPECIFICALLY LAST WEEK'S ACTION OF THE SENATE FRC) ALMOST SURELY IS A HARBINGER OF FURTHER DISASTER IN OUR RELATIONSHIP HERE. I SAY "ALMOST" SURLEY, BECAUSE I DO NOT RULE OUT ALL TOGETHER THE MAKING OF SOME PROGRESS IN THE CYPRUS SITUATION. WITH ALL IT S COMPLEXITIES, HATREDS AND COUNTER-HATREDS, SUSPICIONS AND COUNTER-SUSPICIONS, THE CHANCES OF SEEING SOME PROGRESS TOWARDS AN ENDURING AND MUTUALLY QUASI-SATISFACTORY SOLUTION ARE GREATER AT THIS TIME THAN THEY HAVE BEEN IN EARLIER ERAS OR MAY WELL BE IN THE FUTURE. BUT THE ODDS AGAINST SUCH PROGRESS REMAIN LONG INDEED AND IF IT COMES AT ALL, IT RUNS THE VERY GREAT RISK OF COMING FAR TOO LATE TO HEAD OFF ANOTHER COLLISION -- AND THIS TIME A MORE DAMAGING AND FAR MORE LAST COLLAPSE IN U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS.

7. FORTUNATELY, IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO "SOLVE" THE CYPRUS PROBLEM TO PERMIT A RESTORED U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP, BUT IT IS NECESSARY THAT A PROCESS FOR RESOLVING THE PROBLEM BE GENUINELY AND VISIBLY UNDER WAY. WHILE THIS IS STILL CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 ANKARA 00886 031324Z

POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE, IF THE RESULTS OF OUR EFFORTS (AND THE EFFORTS OF OTHERS) OVER THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF TELL US ANYTHING, THEY TELL US WE CANNOT COUNT ON IT. STILL ANOTHER UNPLEASANT REALITY WE MUST FACE IS THAT EVEN IF CONGRESS REFRAINS FROM REIMPOSING THE EMBARGO, AND EVEN IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT IT SOMEHOW FINDS A WAY TO REMOVE ALL OF ITS PRESENT RESTRICTIONS, ONE CANNOT HELP WONDER, GIVEN THIS CONGRESS' RECORD TO DATE, JUST HOW GOOD THE PROSPECTS ARE THAT WE CAN MOVE TO THE OPPOSIT SIDE OF THE COIN AND PRODUCE A MULTI-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE KIND OF NEW AND VERY SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT WE ARE CURRENTLY NEGOTIATING.

8. WHAT ALL THIS MEANS IS THAT DESPITE MAJOR EFFORTS IN WASHINGTON AND ANKARA TO THE CONTRARY, WE ARE ONCE AGAIN SQUARELY ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH THE TURKS. LIKE

OTHER ALLIES, THE TURKS CAN BE SELFISH, EGOCENTRIC AND UNFEELING OF OUR PROBLEMS, AND THIS MESSAGE IS CERTAINLY NOT DESIGNED AS AN APOLOGIA FOR SOME OF THE THINGS HE HAS DONE IN SYPRUS OR FOR SOME OF HIS MORE SELFISH AND UNREALISTIC OBJECTIVES IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WITH ALL HIS NOTABLE FAULTS (AND IN FACT BECAUSE OF SOME OF THEM) HE IS A VALUABLE ALLY, IRREPLACEABLE AT THIS END OF THE NATO DEFENSES, AND THE QUESTION NOW IS WHAT CAN WE DO TO HEAD OFF THIS COLLISION?

9. THE ANSWERS ARE NEITHER NUMEROUS NOR EASY. OBVIOUSLY WE MUST CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO GET THE PROCESS OF A CYPRUS SOLUTION GENUINELY, AND VISIBLY, UNDER WAY. FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON (IF IT IS NOT ABORTED AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT SENATE ACTION) MAY OFFER OUR LRST TIMELY CHANCE TO GET ACROSS TO THE TURKS THAT WORDS IN COMMUNIQUEs AND PRIVATE ASSURANCES OF GOOD INTENTIONS WILL NO LONGER DO. FOLLOW-UP ACTION IS ESSENTIAL, AND REGARDLESS OF THEIR SUSPICIONS ABOUT GREEK MOTIVES, THEY MUST GET TO THE TABLE AND GET AT LEAST THE BEGINNING STAGES OF A SETTLEMENT PROCESS GENUINELY UNDERWAY.

10. SECONDLY, EVEN THOUGH CAGLAYANGIL MIGHT AGAIN MAKE THE RIGHT NOISES IN WASHINGTON, PAST EXPBCIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THE PROBLEM IS NOT SO MUCH IN GETTING ENCOURAGING STATEMENTS FROM BOTH THE GREEKS AND TURKS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL AS IT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 ANKARA 00886 031324Z

HAS BEEN TO GET ANY TANGIBLE FOLLOW UP. FOR THIS REASON I BELIEVE IT IS NOW THE TIME TO CONSIDER OFFERING A FULL-TIME U.S. INTERMEDIARY TO SHUTTLE CONSTANTLY AMONG THE THREE CAPITALS, SUPPLEMENTING (AND PERHAPS EVENTUALLY REPLACING) THE WALDHEIM EFFORT. I HAVE IN MIND THE NAMING OF A PROMINENT DEMOCRAT-WHICH I WOULD HOPE WOULD HAVE THE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF BEING USEFUL IN PREVENTING DAMAGING CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS WHICH WOULD UNDERCUT HIM IN THE MIDST OF HIS MISSION.

11. FINALLY, WE MUST NOW SQUARELY CONFRONT THE POSSIBILITY THAT DESPITE THE BEST AND MOST VIGOROUS EFFORTS OF THE U.S. AND OTHERS, THE PRESENT HIGHLY UNSATISFACTORY DEFACTO SITUATION IN CYPRUS MAY ENDURE FOR A PROLONGED AND INDEFINITE PERIOD. ASSUMING (WHICH I AM NOT YET PREPARED TO DO) THAT THE U.S. WILL SOON BE ABLE TO REACH A SATISFACTORY NEW BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT WITH THE TURKS, THIS MEANS THAT THE USG, IN ALL ITS PARTS, WILL HAVE TO FACE UP SQARELY TO A KEY QUESTION; NAMELY, WHETHER IT IS PREPARED TO SACRIFICE ITS VITAL ALLIANCE WITH TURKEY AS A RESULT OF DISSATISFACTION WITH TURKISH PERFORMANCE IN AN AREA WHICH LESS DIRECTLY CONCERNS OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.

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